

Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE

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FOR S/P DIRECTOR LAKE AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TARNOFF

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OGEN

SUBJECT: REQUESTED TEXTS

REF: OSLO 2989

FOLLOWING IS THE COMPLETE UNEDITED INTERVIEW OF CASTRO
ON ABC ON SUNDAY, JUNE 18, 1978:

1. MS. WALTERS (W): PRESIDENT CASTRO, THE UNITED STATES
HAS MADE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST YOU; YOU HAVE REFUTED THEM.
I WOULD LIKE TO ASK IF YOU HAVE ANY FIRM PROOF, ANY
DOCUMENTATION TO SHOW THAT YOU DID NOT TRAIN AND SUPPORT
THE KATANGAN REBELS.

2. PRESIDENT CASTRO (C): LOOK, TO TELL YOU THE TRUTH,
THOSE THAT HAVE TO PROVE ANYTHING ARE THOSE THAT MAKE THE
CHARGES. THAT IS WHY IT IS THE U.S. TO PROVE IT. WE
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DON'T EVEN CONSIDER OURSELVES SUBJECTED TO A TRIAL IN ALL
OF THIS. ACTUALLY IT IS NOT A MORAL QUESTION OR A LEGAL
QUESTION SINCE WE, AS ALLIES OF ANGOLA, IN ANGOLA, HAD ALL
THE MORAL RIGHTS AND ALL THE LEGAL RIGHTS TO AID THE
KATANGANS, TO GIVE THEM WEAPONS, TRAINING, ORGANIZATION
AND ALL THAT. WE HAD THE RIGHT TO DO IT.

-- NOW THEN, WHY? BECAUSE FROM ZAIRE, FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS THEY HAVE BEEN ORGANIZING, TRAINING AND EQUIPPING FLEK, THE FNLC, UNITA, WHICH HAVE DONE ENDLESS AMOUNTS OF ATTACKS AND CRIMES AGAINST CABINDA AND AGAINST ANGOLA. SO WE ARE NOT ELUCIDATING HERE A MORAL QUESTION BUT RATHER A POLITICAL QUESTION. WE SIMPLY BECAUSE OF POLITICAL REASONS, HAVE ABSTAINED OURSELVES FROM USING THE KATANGANS AGAINST ZAIRE.

-- THESE REASONS ARE MAINLY -- AND THESE ARE REASONS WE HAVE MAINTAINED SINCE THE END OF THE WAR -- WE FAVOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ZAIRE AND ANGOLA.

-- SECONDLY, WE ARE CLOSE TO THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES IN BLACK AFRICA.

-- THIRD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE MAIN QUESTION IN AFRICA IS THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE PROBLEM OF NAMIBIA AND ZAMBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA AND THAT ANY QUESTION OF THIS NATURE DESTRUCTS (TWO MISSING WORDS) FROM THE MENTAL PROBLEM IN AFRICA.

-- ALL THESE INCURSIONS OF THE KATANGANS ARE HARMFUL TO US. THEY GO AGAINST OUR POLICY. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED APART FROM FOLLOWING THAT, REPORTING THAT WE HAVE OPPOSED THAT. NOW, THAT IS THE POLICY WE HAVE UNCLASSIFIED

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BEEN FOLLOWING FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS.

-- NOW THEN, WE HAVE A WHOLE LOT OF MATERIAL, MESSAGES, WRITINGS OF ALL SORTS, WHICH HAS BEEN OUR POLICY IN ALL THESE THINGS. SO THESE ARE MATERIALS THAT SOME DAY HISTORICALLY WILL BE PUBLISHED. WE HAVE A LOT OF CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ABOUT ALL THESE QUESTIONS.

-- NOW THEN, WHAT I DO MAINTAIN IS THAT WE HAVE KEPT UP THIS POLICY BECAUSE WE HAVE SOLID REASON, DEEP REASONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE FOR NOT COMMITTING OURSELVES WITH THE KATANGANS. WHEN WE FORESAW THE EMERGENCE OF THE PROBLEM, BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT THE PROBLEMS OF THE KATANGANS IS AN OLD PROBLEM AND THAT THIS PROBLEM COULD BRING ABOUT CONFLICT AND THAT IS WHY IN SPITE OF THE FACT THE KATANGANS, IN AN ENDLESS AMOUNT OF WASTE, HAVE ADDRESSED US REQUESTING COOPERATION, ET CETERA, WE HAVE SYSTEMATICALLY REJECTED THAT POSSIBILITY.

3. W: IF IT WERE TO YOUR BENEFIT TO SHOW ONCE AND FOR ALL THAT YOU ARE TELLING THE TRUTH, WOULD YOU SHOW SOME OF THIS WRITTEN DOCUMENTATION PRIVATELY TO CERTAIN U.S.

OFFICIALS SO THAT THE MATTER WAS SETTLED, IF THAT IS THE WAY OF DOING IT?

4. C: I ALWAYS TRUST HISTORY BECAUSE HISTORY ALWAYS PROVES FACTS. HISTORY PROVED THE TRUTH ON THE TONGKIN INCIDENT; HISTORY PROVED THE TRUTH OF WATERGATE; HISTORY PROVED THE TRUTH OF CEYLON; IT PROVED THE TRUTH OF THE BAY OF PIGS. HISTORY PROVED THE TRUTH OF THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE THE LEADER OF THE KHMER ROUGE. HISTORY HAS PROVEN, FOR INSTANCE, WHEN STEVENSON WAS IN THE UNITED NATIONS ON APRIL 15, 1961, AFTER THE UNFAIR ATTACK AGAINST OUR BASES, THEY TOLD A LIE TO STEVENSON. THEY DECEIVED STEVENSON WHEN STEVENSON IN THE UNITED UNCLASSIFIED

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NATIONS DECLARED THAT THESE PLANES WERE CUBAN PLANES, THAT OUR AIR FORCE HAD REBELLED AGAINST US WHEN ACTUALLY THESE WERE PLANES THAT HAD COME FROM NICARAGUA WITH FALSE INSIGNIA SOMEONE INFORMED STEVENSON; IT WAS PRECISELY THE CIA. TO THEN TELL THE GREAT LIE, YOU SEE. SO I TRUSTED YOU. OUR POLICY ON THIS QUESTION CANNOT BE MISLED.

5. W: YOU SAY THAT YOU HAVE NOT TRAINED OR SUPPORTED ANY KATANGESE IN TWO AND A HALF YEARS?

6. C: WE EXPLAINED THIS PROBLEM TO LATE IN THE INTERVIEW. WE EXPLAINED THE FOLLOWING, THAT WE -- FIRST OF ALL, THERE WERE INTER-RACIAL TENSIONS. NOT CUBAN AT ALL IN THAT WHOLE OPERATION. THAT IS, CUBANS THEY WERE NOT PARTICIPATING IN ANYTHING. THERE WERE NO CUBANS IN SHABA. THAT IS, THAT WE HAD NO RESPONSIBILITY, NO DIRECT OR INDIRECT RESPONSIBILITY AROUND THIS QUESTION, THAT WE HAD NOT BEEN ORGANIZING, TRAINING OR EQUIPPING THE KATANGANS, AND THAT EVEN WE WERE AVOIDING CONTACTS WITH THE KATANGANS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE.

-- THE ONLY CONTACT BETWEEN THE KATANGANS AND US WOULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IN AN ACCIDENTAL AND CASUAL WAY AND OUR INSTRUCTIONS ON THAT WERE ALWAYS VERY PRECISE; THAT IS, THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT OUR PARTY AND OUR MILITARY COMMAND GAVE TO OUR PEOPLE IN ANGOLA.

-- I ALSO SENT A MESSAGE TO THE NORTH AMERICANS, TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, SAYING WE OPPOSED THIS TYPE OF OPERATION. I SENT THAT MESSAGE.

-- SOMETHING ELSE. I BELIEVE THIS IS IMPORTANT. I TOLD UNCLASSIFIED

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THEM THAT WE KNEW THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOTHING TO DO

WITH THIS PROBLEM AND IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS POINT OF CLARIFICATION IS VERY IMPORTANT AND WE KNOW THAT THE SOVIETS HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THAT. WE EXPLAINED ALL THE CONTACTS WE HAD WITH NETO; WE EXPLAINED NETO'S POSITION, THAT NETO FULLY AGREED WITH US AND THAT NETO HAD DECIDED TO TAKE MEASURES AGAINST THAT.

-- WE ALSO EXPLAINED TO HIM THE REASONS WHY IN MY OPINION IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO AVOID THAT. I EXPLAINED THAT NETO HAD HAD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY FOR MORE THAN A MONTH, THAT HE HAD HEALTH PROBLEMS THAT WERE PUBLICLY KNOWN AND THAT THEREFORE -- I BELIEVE THAT, WELL, FIRST, HE COULD NOT DEAL WITH THE QUESTION CORRECTLY. SECONDLY, THE ANGOLANS DO NOT HAVE A LOT OF TROOPS IN THAT AREA. THEY HAVE SMALL UNITS IN THAT AREA.

-- THE ANGOLAN ARMY MUST BE IN CHARGE OF DEFENDING THE BORDERS IN KABINDA, DEFEND THE BORDERS IN THE NORTHERN PART OF ANGOLA, WITH ZAIRE. THEY MUST ALSO DEFEND THE BORDER AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA. THE ANGOLAN TROOPS ARE DOING ALL THIS AND THEY HAVE VERY FEW TROOPS IN THE NORTHEASTERN PART.

-- IN THAT AREA THERE ARE THOUSANDS OF KILOMETERS OF BORDER. IT IS NOT AN EASY PROBLEM TO CONTROL. AN ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF REFUGEES, BECAUSE THERE ARE ABOUT 200,000 REFUGEES FROM SHABA IN THAT AREA, AND THE FACT THAT NETO HAD TO LEAVE THE COUNTRY IN MY OPINION IS SOMETHING THAT DID NOT ALLOW HIM PERSONALLY TO CONTROL THAT. ALL THAT WAS EXPLAINED BY US.

7. W: YOU HAD SAID THAT YOU COULD NOT USE YOUR TROOPS UNLESS ANGOLA HAD ASKED YOU TO. PRESIDENT CARTER ASKED WHY CUBA DID NOT USE THEIR TROOPS. IF ANGOLA HAD UNCLASSIFIED

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ASKED WOULD YOU HAVE USED YOUR TROOPS TO STOP THE REBELLION, THE INVASION RATHER?

8. C: WE HAVE NO RIGHT WHATSOEVER TO USE OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL IN ANGOLA ON OUR OWN. OUR PEOPLE ARE THERE UNDER THE ORDERS AND THE PERMISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA. IF THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA HAD ASKED US

OUR COOPERATION TO CONTROL ANY SITUATION WITH THAT, WE ARE WILLING TO GIVE THEM THAT COOPERATION, BUT WE ON OUR OWN CANNOT DO THAT.

9. W: YOU HAVE SEEN THE SUMMARY OF ACCUSATIONS THAT PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE AGAINST

CUBA? IF SO, WOULD YOU GO THROUGH -- OR I CAN GO THROUGH THEM -- WHICHEVER YOU PREFER.

10. C: WELL, THE NEWS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM THIS SUMMARY --ACTUALLY THIS SUMMARY EXPLAINS THE MECHANISM THROUGH WHICH CARTER HAS BEEN DECEIVED. IT IS ON THESE BASES THAT FALSE INFORMATION HAS BEEN OFFERED TO CARTER. THAT IS WHY WE MAKE NO CHARGES AGAINST CARTER, BUT THERE IT IS VERY CLEAR BECAUSE THE ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS THAT I HAVE OUTLINED ARE THE FOLLOWING. THESE ARE THE FOLLOWING, AND IF YOU WISH I COULD MENTION ONE AFTER THE OTHER.

-- POINT NUMBER 1. CUBA COULD HAVE EQUIPPED AND RE-ORGANIZED THE KATANGAN FORCES IN ANGOLA AT A DATE AS EARLY AS 1975. THIS IS TRUE. DURING THE WAR BETWEEN 1975 AND THE BEGINNING OF 1976, THE KATANGANS WERE ON THE SIDE OF THE MPLA. IN SHABA THEY FOUGHT TOGETHER WITH THE ANGOLANS AND TOGETHER WITH US IN SOME FRONTS. AT THAT TIME THERE WAS A CERTAIN COOPERATION. THEY STRUGGLED TOGETHER
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WITH THE MPLA BECAUSE THEY KNEW THAT IF SOUTH AFRICA AND ZAIRE WOULD TAKE HOLD OF ANGOLA THEY WERE GOING TO EXTERMINATE THE KATANGAN REFUGEES.

-- NOW, THE SUMMARY GOES ON SAYING THAT CUBA OFFERED PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR AN INVASION ON SHABA ON THE PART OF TWO THOUSAND KATANGANS IN MARCH OF 1977 AND AFTER THE FAILURE OF SUCH ACTION THEY CONTINUED ASSISTING THE REBELS UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE LAST ATTEMPT OF INVASION LAST MONTH. I SAY THIS IS A LIE. A TOTAL LIE, BECAUSE WE DID NOT COOPERATE AT LEAST AT ALL WITH THE PAST INCURSION IN SHABA AND WE HAVE SAID THIS PUBLICLY.

-- SECOND, THE SUMMARY ACCUSES -- WELL, IT SAYS THAT SOVIET AND CUBAN ADVISERS HAD REQUESTED FROM THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT IN 1976 TO ALLOW INCURSIONS WITHIN ZAIRE AND THAT CUBAN PERSONNEL AND EAST GERMAN PERSONNEL TRAINED THE REBELS IN THE AIR BASE OF SOLEMO (?) IN THE ANGOLAN PROVINCE OF LUANDA. I SAY THIS IS ABSOLUTELY FALSE. IT IS A TOTAL LIE.

-- THIRD, IT SAID THAT AFTER THE 1977 INVASION, CUBAN

INSTRUCTORS TRAINED THE REBELS IN FIVE BASES IN THE
NORTH-EASTERN PART OF ANGOLA (INAUDIBLE)
AND I SAY THAT THIS ABSOLUTELY FALSE.

-- FOURTH, AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR, THE KATANGAN
LEADER (INAUDIBLE) DECLARED HIS INTENTION TO ELIMINATE
THE ZAIRE GOVERNMENT AND GUARANTEED IN ORDER TO DO SO
WE HAD CUBA'S -- EXCUSE ME, ANGOLA'S SUPPORT. I DON'T
KNOW ABOUT THAT. I CANNOT KNOW WHAT YOU DECLARED OR
WHAT NEMUMBA (?) SAID AND I IMAGINE THAT THE PEOPLE
THAT ARE IN ACTIVITIES OF THIS TYPE MANY TIMES SAY FALSE
THINGS, THAT THEY HAVE THIS SUPPORT OR THAT SUPPORT.

-- NOW, NUMBER 5. DURING ALL THIS TIME CUBANS WERE
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INVOLVED IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE LOGISTICS OF THE
REBEL MOVEMENT TOWARD THE ZAMBIAN BORDER AND THEY
ACCOMPANIED THEM UNTIL A POINT, IN WHICH THEY LEFT THE
ANGOLAN TERRITORY. SO I GUESS THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY
FALSE.

-- WE HAVE NOT ORGANIZED ANY SUPPLIES. WE HAVE NOT
GIVEN ANY MATERIAL SUPPLIES TO THE KATANGANS. WE HAVE
NOT TAKEN A SINGLE KATANGAN SOLDIER TO ANY PART, SO
THAT I THINK THIS IS TOTALLY FALSE.

-- NOW THEN, THERE IS SOMETHING (ONE WORD MISSING).
WHAT INTEREST COULD WE HAVE IF THE ADVENTURES OF THE
KATANGANS PLAY THE GAME OF THE INTERESTS OF NETO AND
OF WESTERN INTERESTS? THESE KATANGAN INSURGENTS
ARE HARMFUL TO OUR POLICY IN AFRICA. WHAT COULD BE
OUR INTEREST TO CARRY OUT THIS TYPE OF MANEUVER? THESE
MADNESSES? IF IT WERE A QUESTION OF A REPRISAL BECAUSE
OF THE ACTIONS OF ZAIRE AGAINST ANGOLA, IT WOULD BE
COMPLETELY JUST. BUT, FROM THE POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW
THESE ADVENTURES WORK AGAINST OUR POLITICAL LINES
AND OUR POLITICAL INTERESTS IN AFRICA. SO WHY WOULD
WE HAVE TO SUPPORT THESE MADNESSES? THAT IS THE
PROBLEM. BECAUSE THERE IS A DEEP REASON, A SOLID REASON
FOR A POLITICAL PRICE. THAT IS THE REASON WHY WE
SHOULD NOT WANT TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENTS WITH THE
KATANGANS. WE DID NOT WANT TO DO IT.

11. W: PRESIDENT CASTRO, YOU HAVE SAID THAT PRESIDENT
CARTER IS CONFUSED AND YOU HAD NAMED NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER BRZEZINSKI AS THE MAN WHO IS CHIEFLY RESPONSIBLE
FOR CAUSING THIS CONFUSION. DO YOU THINK BRZEZINSKI
IS A LIAR?
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12. C: I THINK MORE THAN THAT. I THINK HE IS CYNICAL.
I SINCERELY BELIEVE IT. VERY CYNICAL.

13. W: WELL, WHY WOULD HE BE DOING THIS?

14. C: TO BEGIN WITH, I BELIEVE HIS IS IRRESPONSIBLE,
ADVENTURISTIC AND HE IS A LIAR. THESE FOUR THINGS.
HE IS A MAN WITH A LOT OF PREJUDICE IN MY OPINION. HE
IS A MAN WHO DOES NOT MASTER INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS.
HE IGNORES THE REALITIES OF TODAY'S WORLD AND IT SEEMS
TO ME HE PLAYS WITH WAR. THAT IS MY OPINION.

-- NOW, THEN, WITH RESPECT TO CUBA, HE HAS THE SAME
PREJUDICES THAT HE HAS REGARDING THE SOVIET UNION.

-- NOW THEN, WHAT DID BRZEZINSKI DO? EVERYBODY IN THE
UNITED STATES KNOWS THAT HE SENT THESE MAPS TO TIME
MAGAZINE. HE SAID THE MAPS SHOWED THE PLACES WHERE
THERE WERE CUBAN TROOPS. THESE FIGURES WERE FALSE; MANY
OF THESE WERE EXAGGERATED. IN SOME CASES HE PINPOINTED
PLACES WHERE THERE WERE CUBAN COOPERATORS, COLLABORATORS,
MILITARY COLLABORATORS, WHERE THEY DID NOT EXIST AND
THIS HAPPENED A FEW MONTHS AGO. AT THE END OF LAST
YEAR WHEN THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA
WERE IMPROVING. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT HE HAD THE DELIBERATE
PURPOSE OF CREATING A CONFLICT, AN UNFAVORABLE CLIMATE
AND OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON US BECAUSE WE, OUR STRONG
POINT AS BEEN THAT OUR COOPERATION WITH CERTAIN AFRICAN
COUNTRIES IS A FACULTY, A CERTAIN SOVEREIGN FACULTY OF
OURS AND IT IS FULLY LEGAL (INAUDIBLE) THAT SAME THING
IN MY OPINION HAS THE PURPOSE OF EXERTING PRESSURE ON
US AND WE TRULY REJECT IT. ALL SORTS OF PRESSURE AND
THREATS. THAT IS NOT THE PATH. THAT IS NOT THE WAY
TO DEAL WITH US NOR TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

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-- SECOND, WHEN IN THE SENATE THEY WERE DISCUSSING THE
SALE OF THE F-16 PLANE TO SAUDI ARABIA, FROM BRZEZINSKI'S
OFFICE THERE ALSO CAME THE UTTERANCE THAT CUBA WAS
MILITARILY COOPERATING WITH YEMEN AND THAT THAT WAS A
DANGER FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND FOR THE SECURITY OF THE WEST.

-- HE REFERRED TO AN OLD AND VERY MODEST COOPERATION

THAT WE HAVE HAD FOR MORE THAN SIX YEARS BUT HE
NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGED THE (MISSING WORD) AS SOMETHING
THAT WAS FIT, THAT SOMETHING THAT WAS NEW, TO CREATE,
TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE CONGRESS AND, FINALLY, WHEN
THE UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT OF SHABA OCCURRED THEY USED
THAT OPPORTUNITY -- THEY PICKED IT UP AS US RESPONSIBLE,
IN A SLANDEROUS WAY. AN EPISODE CUBA HAD NOTHING TO
DO WITH, THE INCIDENT, EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY.
THAT IS THE POLICY OF THE COUNTRY.

15. W: OUR GUEST TODAY ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" IS
THE PRESIDENT OF CUBA, FIDEL CASTRO.

-- PRESIDENT CASTRO, YOU CALLED OUR NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER BRZEZINSKI A LIAR. DO YOU THINK THAT HE IS SO
STRONG A PERSONALITY AND HIS OPINIONS SO STRONG THAT HE
CAN CONFUSE THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE SECRETARY OF STATE? DOES HE HAVE THIS KIND OF
POWER?

16. C: LOOK, I TALKED TO YOU ABOUT CUBA'S -- ABOUT
BRZEZINSKI'S POSITION ABOUT CUBA. HIS FULL PREJUDICES.
BUT HIS INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ARE ALSO DANGEROUS.
BRZEZINSKI FAVORS MIXING THINGS AS IMPORTANT AS NEGOTIA-
TIONS ON SALT, THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS, WITH PROBLEMS
OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, SECONDARY PROBLEMS AND PROBLEMS
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OF AFRICA. BRZEZINSKI IS CLEARLY IN FAVOR OF USING
CHINA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PRESSURE AGAINST THE SOVIET
UNION AND I WOULD BELIEVE THAT THAT IS A VERY DANGEROUS
AND SERIOUS POLICY. WE SHOULD NOT, TOO.

-- THE OCTOBER CRISIS -- AT THE TIME OF THE OCTOBER
CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES WAS ALMOST AT THE BRINK OF GOING
INTO A WAR AS A RESULT OF THE PRESENCE OF STRATEGIC
MISSILES IN CUBA AND NOW WE FACE AN INDIVIDUAL WITH
DEFENDING A POLICY OF USING CHINA AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
PRESSURE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IS A NUCLEAR
POWER AND CHINA IS VERY NEAR THE SOVIET UNION. SO I
BELIEVE HIS IS AN ADVENTURISTIC POLICY, AN IRRESPONSIBLE
POLICY AND A DANGEROUS ONE AND EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT.
NOW, THEN, YOU ARE ASKING ME IF HE IS A STRONG
PERSONALITY. I HAVE NOT MET HIM. I DON'T KNOW HIM.

17. W: IF OUR PRESIDENT IS SO WEAK --

18. C: BUT HE HAS INFLUENCE. THE REASON WHY HE
HAS THE INFLUENCE, I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW WHAT
FORCE HE REPRESENTS IN THE U.S. WHO IS HE ALLIED TO

IN THE U.S. BUT I DO KNOW THAT HE IS THE MAIN ADVISER
OF CARTER IN SECURITY AND I ALSO KNOW THAT HE IS WITH
CARTER CONSTANTLY THROUGHOUT THE DAY. THE FIRST
OFFICIAL TO TALK TO CARTER EVERY DAY IS BRZEZINSKI.
I DON'T KNOW WHY. I DON'T KNOW THE HISTORY, BUT I
AM LIMITING MYSELF TO FACTS.

-- NOW THEN, I KNOW, AND EVERYBODY KNOWS THAT
BRZEZINSKI REPRESENTS A TENDENCY IN THE UNITED STATES.

THERE ARE OTHER MUCH MORE WISE, RESPONSIBLE AND PRUDENT
REALISTIC TENDENCIES REPRESENTED IN MY OPINION BY
VANCE, YOUNG AND SOME OF THESE PERSONALITIES. I
BELIEVE THAT VANCE'S POLICY IS NOT EXACTLY BRZEZINSKI'S
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POLICY AND YOUNG'S POLICY IN MY OPINION IS NOT THE
SAME POLICY AS BRZEZINSKI'S ON AFRICA.

19. W: OUR AMBASSADOR?

20. C: YES, AMBASSADOR YOUNG.

21. W: BUT ARE YOU SAYING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER IS
SO UNEXPERIENCED, SO EASILY CONFUSED THAT THIS MAN CAN
CLOUD HIS MIND?

22. C: LOOK. I HAVE -- PERSONALLY I HAVE A GOOD
OPINION OF CARTER. I BELIEVE PRESIDENT CARTER IS AN
INTELLIGENT MAN. I BELIEVE THAT CARTER HAS SHOWED
EXCEPTIONAL PERSONALITY QUALITIES IN HIS CAMPAIGN AND
IN HIS STRUGGLE FOR THE PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES.

-- ON OTHER OPPORTUNITIES I HAVE SAID, AND I REPEAT
MY CONVICTION, THAT CARTER IS A MAN WITH ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES THAT ARE BASED ON A RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND
ACTUALLY MY CRITERIA UPON CARTER HAS NOT CHANGED. SO
I PERSONALLY DO NOT DOUBT CARTER'S SERIOUSNESS, HIS
PERSONAL HONESTY AND HIS INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY. BUT
IT IS NOT THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, BOTH IN THE HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES, NOR IS IT THE FIRST TIME IN THE
HISTORY OF THE WORLD THAT SOME INDIVIDUAL RECEIVES A
SOMEWHAT IMPORTANT INFLUENCE.

-- YOU SHOULD CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING: THE UNITED
STATES IS A VERY LARGE COUNTRY. THEY HAVE RELATIONS
WITH EVERYBODY. A PRESIDENT PROBABLY MUST DEAL WITH
AN ENDLESS AMOUNT OF PROBLEMS; HE MUST BE ADVISED BY
AN ENDLESS AMOUNT OF PEOPLE AND NOBODY CAN DENY THAT
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ADVISERS HAVE A GREAT INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL LEADERS.
THAT WE KNOW. THAT IS HISTORICAL AND IT HAPPENS
EVERY DAY.

23. W: YOU ARE NOT MEETING WITH HIM FACE TO FACE. DO
YOU HAVE A MESSAGE TO GIVE HIM NOW, SOMETHING YOU
COULD SAY TO HIM -- HE HAS ASKED YOU TO PLEDGE THERE
WILL BE NO FURTHER INCURSIONS INTO ZAIRE, FOR EXAMPLE.
IS THERE SOMETHING YOU PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO SAY TO
HIM?

24. C: I BELIEVE, IF I WERE TO ASK ANYTHING, I WOULD
ASK THAT HE SHOULD USE ALL MEANS AT HIS REACH -- AND
IT IS NOT ONLY THE CIA; THERE ARE CONGRESSMEN, THERE
ARE POLITICAL PEOPLE, THERE ARE JOURNALISTS, SO THAT
HE REALLY BECOMES CONVINCED ABOUT THE FACT THAT IF,
AFTER THE WAR OF ANGOLA ENDED WE HAVE HAD A POLICY THAT
SUPPORTING THE KATANGANS, OF USING THE KATANGANS IN
ZAIRE, OR IS IT EXACTLY TOTALLY THE CONTRARY, WHEN
WE PROTEST FOR THIS CHARGE IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE
WE ARE CHARGED WITH SOMETHING WHICH IS EXACTLY THE
OPPOSITE OF WHAT OUR POLICY REGARDING THAT ISSUE HAS
BEEN AND WE ARE NOT GIVING LIES; WE ARE NOT DENYING
THAT WE HAVE VERY CLOSE RELATIONS WITH SWAPO, WITH
SAN NOHOMO, (?) AND WE SUPPORT HIM. WE HAVE VERY CLOSE
RELATIONS WITH NKOMO. WE SUPPORT HIM. WE HAVE CLOSE
RELATIONS WITH THE PATRIOTS IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE HAVE
RECEIVED OLIVER TOMBO (?) IN OUR COUNTRY AND ALL THESE
LEADERS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN OUR COUNTRY AND WE STILL
SUPPORT THEM. WE DO NOT HIDE THAT. WE ARE SYMPATHETIC
TOWARD THE ZAORWE (?) PATRIOTS IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR
INDEPENDENCE. WE DO NOT HIDE THIS. WE HAVE NEVER
PROVEN FALSE OUR POLICY BECAUSE OUR POLICY IS BASED IN
PRINCIPLE.

-- WE CAN BE DISCREET, NOT SPEAK OF OUR PROBLEMS, BUT
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NOBODY CAN SAY THAT WE HAVE PROVEN FALSE OUR SUPPORT
TO A POLITICAL MOVEMENT WHENEVER WE HAVE SUPPORTED IT.
NOT EVEN DURING THE OCTOBER CRISIS. YOU SHOULD LOOK AT
ALL STATEMENTS MADE BY CUBA AND ALL THE PAPERS OF BOTH
SIDES AND WE NEVER DENIED THAT THERE WERE ROCKETS
THERE. HOW SUFFICIENT, AND WE MAINTAINED AT THE
UNITED NATIONS THAT WE HAD THE RIGHT TO HAVE THIS TYPE

OF WEAPON THAT WE CONSIDERED TO BE NECESSARY FOR OUR DEFENSE AND THAT WE DID NOT HAVE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNT TO THE UNITED STATES ABOUT WHAT WEAPONS WE HAD. THAT WAS OUR POSITION DURING THE FIRST CRISIS AND THAT WAS A TREMENDOUS PROBLEM. IT WAS MUCH MORE AN IMPORTANT PROBLEM THAN THIS QUESTION RELATED TO ZAIRE.

-- NOW THEN, WE ARE NOT OBLIGED TO ACCEPT THE LIES. I DEFEND AND I SAY IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OUR POLICY AND THAT OUR POLICY HAS BEEN EXACTLY OPPOSITE THOSE ADVENTURES OF THE KATANGANS IN ZAIRE AND THIS IS WHAT I MAINTAIN AND WE CANNOT ACCEPT ANYTHING ELSE BECAUSE THAT IS THE TRUTH.

-- THE PROBLEM IS NOT SO IMPORTANT IN ITSELF AS THE FACT THAT WE ARE REALLY DEFENDING A POSITION WHICH HAS BEEN OUR POSITION, THE INSTRUCTIONS THAT OUR PARTY AND OUR GOVERNMENT HAVE ALWAYS GIVEN TO OUR CIVILIAN AND MILITARY PEOPLE IN ANGOLA, AND EVEN WHENEVER THERE WAS ANY TYPE OF ACCIDENTAL OR CAUSUAL OR CLASH, BECAUSE OF THE SLIGHTEST VIOLATION OF INSTRUCTIONS, DECISIVE ORDERS WERE GIVEN TO OUR PEOPLE REGARDING THIS AND THAT IS THE LINE WE HAVE ALWAYS FOLLOWED. ON THIS QUESTION WE DO HAVE A LOT OF DOCUMENTS AND PAPERS AND I BELIEVE THAT SOME DAY ALL THIS WILL BE KNOWN. I AM NOT GOING TO REFER HERE TO ALL THE CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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DOCUMENTS WE HAVE.

-- THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE THAT IS HISTORICAL YET WHOLLY TRUE. WE, IN THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY WHEN WE HEARD RUMORS, WE HAD NO CERTAINTY; WE HAD NO INFORMATION, WE HAD NO EXACT INFORMATION. WE HAD HEARD RUMORS THAT THE KATANGANS WERE PREPARING A NEW MILITARY OPERATION; WE BECAME SERIOUSLY CONCERNED AND WE BECAME CONCERNED BECAUSE IT IS PLAIN THAT ALL THAT PLAYS THE GAME OF OUR ENEMIES, THAT ALL THAT PALYS THE GAME OF INTERVENTIONIST PLANS OF NATO. THAT IS OUR STARTING POINT.

-- IN CUBA THERE WAS (INAUDIBLE) AT THAT TIME WHO IS THE MAIN REPRESENTATIVE OF OUR STATE AND OUR PARTY IN ANGOLA. HE WAS ON A VACATION AND WE ASKED HIM TO STOP HIS VACATION, TO INTERRUPT HIS VACATION, PLEASE, TO TRAVEL TO ANGOLA TO INFORM NETO ABOUT THESE RUMORS AND ABOUT OUR CONCERNS AND ABOUT THE NEED TO AVOID THIS PROBLEM.

-- PRECISE INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO COMRADE BROUCHETTE (?). WE WARNED HIM ABOUT WHAT WAS GOING TO HAPPEN IF

SOMETHING LIKE THIS WOULD OCCUR. PRESIDENT NETO WAS FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH US. WE TRUST THE PRESIDENT NETO BECAUSE HE IS A SERIOUS, HONEST, HONORABLE MAN AND SO WE KNOW THAT NETO TALKED WITH THE KATANGANS. WE KNOW NETO GAVE INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID THIS EVENT. SO THEN WE DID THE MOST WE COULD DO. WE COULD NOT DO ANYTHING ELSE, NOR CAN WE BE ASKED TO DO ANYTHING ELSE.

-- WE HAVE DOCUMENTS ABOUT THAT, ALSO.

-- THIS IS NOT THE MOMENT TO START BRINGING INTO LIGHT ALL THE CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS OF CUBAN STATE BUT WE

HAVE A LOT OF DOCUMENTS ABOUT THAT. WE HAVE PAPERS.
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I CAN TELL YOU WE HAVE PAPERS. AND THIS QUESTION OF CONVERSATIONS, THE MESSAGE ON THE PART OF VERY SKILLED OFFICIALS OF THE U.S. ON AFRICA. WE HAVE THAT. AND THE PREVIOUS STATEMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE BETWEEN THE 12TH TO THE 15TH OF MAY, THAT IT REALLY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THESE PROBLEMS; THESE WERE THE THINGS WHICH I THINK MOTIVATED ME TO MAKE THE GESTURE OF MEETING WITH (WORD MISSING) TO EXPLAIN BROADLY, IN DETAIL, A TOTAL WAY TO EXPLAIN ALL THESE PROBLEMS.

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT LEARNED OF THIS MESSAGE ON THE 18TH OF MAY. THEY SEND A KIND ANSWER EXPRESSING ITS SATISFACTION. I RECEIVED THE MESSAGE ON THE 19TH IN THE MORNING. ON THE 19TH AT NOON, THE NEWS MY MESSAGE LEAKED OUT AND IN THE AFTERNOON A BRUTAL CHARGE THROUGH RESTON THE EVENTS IN SHABA.

-- WHY DID THESE THINGS HAPPEN? WHY DIDN'T THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ADDRESS, THROUGH THAT SAME CONFIDENTIAL CHANNEL, SO THAT WE COULD MAKE SURE --

25. W: WHY?

26. C: -- ALL THESE--

27. W: WHY?

28. C: WELL, WHY DIDN'T THEY DO IT? WELL, THE WAY I SEE IT, ON THE 19TH, WHEN ALL THE INTERVENTION OF NATO WAS GOING ON WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NEWS, WHEN IT WAS LEAKED PROBABLY THURSDAY -- THE NEWS THAT I WAS GIVEN THE CERTAINTY TO THE U.S. THAT NEITHER
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CUBANS NOR SOVIETS NOR ANGOLA HAD ANY PLAN TO CREATE A PROBLEM THERE -- THAT MESSAGE WAS HARMFUL

(BREAK IN TRANSCRIPT)

29. C: -- TO THE INTERVENTION PLANS GOING ON AND IN MY OPINION THAT IS WHY ON THE 19TH THEY HAD TO IMPROVISE, TO INVENT LIES, TO CHARGE US, TO PROVE US FALSE, BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS WAS DONE IN A HURRY AND IN A SUPERFICIAL WAY AND ALL HAS SERVED LATER TO JUSTIFY THE INTERVENTION OF THE NATO FORCES IN ZAIRE, THE PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES, INTERVENTION, AND HAS SERVED TO JUSTIFY A DEMAND OF THE U.S. SENATE TO SUPPRESS THE RESTRICTION THAT TOOK PLACE AFTER THE WATERGATE ISSUE AND AFTER THE (BLANK IN TRANSCRIPT) OF ALL THE HISTORY OF THE CIA ACTIVITIES. SO THAT IS WHAT I SAID, THAT THIS IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE KNOW, WE KNOW FROM VERY GOOD SOURCES THAT RECENTLY THE CIA ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH UNITA IN ANGOLA AND ADMITTED THE UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE. PROMISED U.S. ASSISTANCE. WE KNOW THAT FROM VERY GOOD SOURCES.

-- I WANT TO ASK THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IF IT IS A TRUE POINT THAT THAT COMMITMENT WAS MADE BECAUSE -- THIS CONSTITUTES A VERY SERIOUS INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA'S INTERIOR AFFAIRS.

30. W: YOU SAY THAT THE CIA RIGHT NOW IS INTERFERING IN THE DOMESTIC POLICY OF ANGOLA LIKE AIDING UNITA?

31. C: YES, I DECLARE IT SO, IN A FULLY RESPONSIBLE WAY. WE KNOW THAT FROM VERY GOOD SOURCES.

32. W: DO YOU THINK --

33. C: YES, FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THAT THIS TRUE OR NOT.

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34. W: DO YOU THINK PRESIDENT CARTER KNOWS THIS?

35. C: I DON'T KNOW. I REALLY CANNOT AFFIRM THAT.

36. W: MR. PRESIDENT, HOW MUCH DO YOU THINK THAT THIS WHOLE INCIDENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA -- HOW

MUCH DAMAGE DO YOU THINK IT HAS CAUSED? WHEN YOU AND I TALKED ALMOST A YEAR AGO TO THIS DAY YOU SAID YOU THOUGHT THERE MIGHT BE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS DURING PRESIDENT CARTER'S SECOND TERM, IF HE HAD A SECOND TERM. HOW BAD ARE RELATIONS NOW?

37. C: I SAID THAT, THINKING IN A REALISTIC WAY THAT IT WAS NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO BUILD UP IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME WHAT WAS DESTROYED FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

-- NOW, THEN, I WILL SAY THE FOLLOWING: THIS INSOLENT IS HOSTILE AND OFFENSIVE. IT MAKES ME LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. WHY? BECAUSE THERE WAS NO DISCRETION. IT IS TRUE THAT WE COULD NOT TALK DISCREETLY WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT BECAUSE YOU SEND THEM A MESSAGE ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS AND THEY IMMEDIATELY PROPAGANDIZE THAT. IT LEAKS OUT.

-- IT IS TRUE THAT WE CANNOT TALK DISCREETLY WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. YOU ANSWER THE ATTITUDES OF THE DENUNCIATION MADE AGAINST US IMMEDIATELY AFTER I MADE THAT GESTURE WHICH MAKES ME LOSE FAITH IN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. I BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AMONG OTHER THINGS, MAKES THE SAME MISTAKES THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS MAKE. LIKE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT OF UNDERESTIMATING CUBA. THEY UNDERESTIMATE CUBA. THEY DESPISE CUBA. THAT UNCLASSIFIED

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ALREADY HAPPENED DURING THE BAY OF PIGS, AND THAT HAS HAPPENED.

-- THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT LEARNED TO KNOW CUBA. THEY HAVE NOT LEARNED THAT A POLICY TO DEAL WITH CUBA IN AN HONORABLE WAY, BECAUSE THEY ALWAYS RESORT TO PRESSURES, CAMPAIGNS, THREATS AND THESE PROCEDURES DO NOT LEAD TO ANYTHING.

-- THERE IS A SAYING THAT SAYS: NO MATTER HOW BAD THINGS GO, SOMETHING GOOD MIGHT COME OUT OF IT.

38. W: WELL, IT COULD GET WORSE.

39. C: HOPEFULLY IT COULD GET BETTER. THIS HELPS US TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER; TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER, AND TO BE MORE SERIOUS IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM.

ON THE OTHER HAND, I EXPECT WE WERE WAITING FOR CARTER'S SECOND TERM. WITH THIS WHAT WE WERE SAYING WAS A DESIRE THAT CARTER WOULD BE RE-ELECTED TO THE PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES. ACTUALLY IF YOU ASK ME NOW I WILL SAY

THAT OUR DESIRE IS THAT CARTER BE RE-ELECTED BECAUSE
IF IT IS NOT CARTER, WHO WILL IT BE?

40. W: WHAT ABOUT FORD OR REAGAN?

41. C: REAGAN IS THE MOST REACTIONARY THING THAT WE KNOW
OF. FORD AND KISSINGER WERE CHARACTERIZED AS BEING
ANTI-CUBA. WHATEVER THESE PRESENT PROBLEMS, WE ACKNOWLEDGE
THAT CARTER WAS THE ONLY U.S. PRESIDENT IN THE LAST
FEW YEARS WHO MADE PROPER GESTURES TOWARDS CUBA.

42. W: HOW WOULD YOU FEEL ABOUT TED KENNEDY IF HE SHOULD
DECIDE TO RUN? WOULD THAT BE BETTER FOR CUBAN-AMERICAN
RELATIONS?

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43. C: I COULD NOT ASSURE THIS. FIRST IT IS NOT MY DUTY
TO SPEAK WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, BETWEEN CARTER AND
KENNEDY. ACTUALLY I HAVE NO PREJUDICE REGARDING EDWARD
KENNEDY. I KNOW HE HAS FORCE; I KNOW HE HAS A LOT OF
SYMPATHIZERS IN THE U.S., AND I HAVE NO PREJUDICE
REGARDING HIM. BUT IT IS NOT MY DUTY TO DECIDE.

-- NOW TO TELL THE TRUTH, IF YOU ASKED ME, I WOULD WISH
THAT CARTER BE RE-ELECTED PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.
WELL, TO THAT QUESTION I WOULD SAY THAT REALLY WE WOULD
FEEL HAPPY FOR THAT. WHY? HE IS THE ONLY PRESIDENT
IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS TO HAVE HAD SOME POSITIVE
GESTURES TOWARD US.

-- SECONDLY, I BELIEVE THAT HE IS A MAN OF CONVICTIONS,
PERSONAL CONVICTIONS. HE IS AN HONEST MAN. I BELIEVE
THAT THESE DIFFICULTIES OF THE FIRST STAGE CAN BE REALLY
DUE SOMEWHAT TO A LACK OF EXPERIENCE. I REALLY TELL YOU
THE TRUTH. SOMETIMES IT IS NOT CONVENIENT FOR A COUNTRY
TO BE SUBSTITUTING THE PRESIDENT EVERY FOUR YEARS BECAUSE
WHEN THEY START TO GET EXPERIENCE, THEY CHANGE OFF. THEN
THEY SPEND ALL THEIR LIVES LEARNING.

44. W: THAT IS THE WAY OUR COUNTRY IS, THOUGH. MR.
PRESIDENT, WHEN DO YOU THINK WE WILL HAVE NORMALIZATION
BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES? WILL IT BE WITHIN MY LIFETIME;
AND I AM GETTING VERY OLD.

45. C: I THINK SO, BECAUSE BARBARA IS GOING TO HAVE A
LONG LIFE.

46. W: YOU THINK IT IS GOING TO BE A LONG TIME?
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47. C: WE SHOULD NOT BE SO PESSIMISTIC, ACTUALLY.

-- THE QUESTION IS ASKED ABOUT OUR POSITION. OUR POSITION IS POSITIVE TOWARD THAT. OF COURSE, I BELIEVE THERE IS SOMETHING WE CANNOT FORGET. IF IN THE WORLD AN ENVIRONMENT OF A COLD WAR IS CREATED AND AN ENVIRONMENT OF AN ENCLAVE -- IF AN ENVIRONMENT OF PEACE AND THE COLD WAR AND ENCLAVES ARE AVOIDED AND THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IMPROVED AND THEN THERE WILL BE GREATER POSSIBILITIES OF IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I HAVE NO WISH TO DO ANYTHING TO BRING ABOUT PROBLEMS TO CARTER. I SAY THIS VERY HONESTLY.

-- ON THE OTHER HAND, WE DO NOT WISH TO DO ANYTHING THAT COULD MULTIPLY INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. I BELIEVE THAT ALL PEOPLES, THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PEOPLE OF THE USSR AND THE PEOPLE OF THE THIRD WORLD AND TO CUBA, IT IS CONVENIENT TO HAVE AN ENVIRONMENT OF DETENTE AND PEACE BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS BENEFICIAL TO ALL AND WE WOULD NEVER REJECT ANY OPPORTUNITY FOR A POSSIBILITY TO DO SOMETHING IN THAT DIRECTION.

48. W: WHEN DO YOU FORESEE CUBAN TROOPS BEING WITHDRAWN FROM AFRICA?

49. C: WELL, THAT WILL DEPEND ON HOW EVENTS EVOLVE. WE HAVE NO INTEREST WHATSOEVER IS MAINTAINING PERMANENTLY OUR PEOPLE IN AFRICA. WE PREFER -- AND I THINK I TOLD YOU ONCE -- WE PREFER TO SEND DOCTORS THAN SOLDIERS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT IT IS NECESSARY THAT SOME PROBLEMS BE SOLVED -- THE PROBLEMS OF NAMIBIA IN BIAFRA, THE PROBLEM OF SOUTH AFRICA. AS LONG AS SOUTH AFRICA AND RACISM AND FACISM CONSTITUTE A RISK FOR THE PEOPLES OF BLACK AFRICA, LOGICALLY THERE WILL ALSO BE A DANGER FOR THESE PEOPLE AND THEY WILL BE INTERESTED, I BELIEVE, IN

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OUR MILITARY COOPERATION. BUT NO ONE WOULD BE HAPPIER THAN US IF ALL THESE PROBLEMS ARE OVERCOME AND NONE OF THESE COUNTRIES WOULD BE FACED WITH THE NEED OF RECEIVING OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

50. W: THAT CAN BE A LONG TIME, THOUGH.

51. C: IT MAY BE A LONG TIME. I AM NOT GOING TO DECEIVE

YOU. IT MIGHT BE.

"-

52. W: TWENTY YEARS?

53. C: TOO MUCH. I CANNOT BE THAT PESSIMISTIC.

54. W: ARE YOU ABLE TO TELL US HOW MANY --

55. C: BESIDES THIS QUESTION OF OUR PRESENCE IN SOME COUNTRIES WAS DUE TO AGREEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED WITH THESE COUNTRIES, AND WE UNILATERALLY CANNOT DECIDE UPON THESE PROBLEMS. THEY MUST BE SOLVED IN COMMON AGREEMENT BETWEEN THESE COUNTRIES AND US.

56. W: CAN YOU TELL US HOW MANY TROOPS YOU HAVE IN AFRICA AND HOW MANY CASUALTIES YOU HAVE HAD?

57. C: I AM NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU EXACT FIGURES. I AM NOT GOING TO GIVE YOU EXACT FIGURES ON THE AMOUNT OF TROOPS. I THINK IT IS A LITTLE BIT LESS THAN WHEN THE CIA IS INFORMING YOU AND THE CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN VERY FEW, FORTUNATELY.

58. W: WHAT ESTIMATE ARE YOU SAYING THE CIA USE?
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59. C: THE CIA THINKS OF ABOUT 40,000 MEN AS A WHOLE AND I THINK THAT THAT IS WHAT IS SOMEWHAT EXAGGERATED.

60. W: YOU SAID RECENTLY THAT YOU SEE THE SOLUTION TO ETHIOPIA AS A MARXIST-LENIN SOLUTION. DOES THAT MEAN THAT YOU SEE ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA BEING LIKE THE SOVIET UNION, AN AMALGAMATION OF STATES?

61. C: WELL, IT IS NOT EXACTLY THE SAME SITUATION. UNDOUBTEDLY IN SOME PART OF ETHIOPIA THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF WHAT COULD BE CONSIDERED AS NATIONALITIES. NOT IN THE SAME SENSE AS WAS IN THE SOVIET UNION. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE HAD A POSITION ON THIS. WE FAVOR JUST POLITICAL SOLUTIONS, BASING OURSELVES ON LENINIST PRINCIPLES, TO THE PROBLEM OF NATIONALITIES (BLANK IN TRANSCRIPT) WITHIN THE REVOLUTIONARY OF THE OPEN STATE, WHICH PRESERVES AS AN IRRENOUNCIBLE RIGHT ITS DUTY, ITS PROOF OF INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY.

-- NOW I CANNOT BE TOO CONCRETE. WE ARE CONTRARY TO THE DISINTEGRATION OF ETHIOPIA AND WE ARE AGAINST SECESSION.

WE FAVOR A UNIFIED ETHIOPIA AND AT THE SAME TIME WE FAVOR THE POLITICAL SOLUTION OF THE PENDING QUESTION WITHIN A LENIN PRINCIPLE WHICH IS KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

BUT IT RECOGNIZES, AS BROAD AS IS POSSIBLE, THE RIGHT OF THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE COUNTRY, AND WHERE THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF NATIONALITY ALSO RECOGNIZES IT. I CANNOT PROPOSE CONCRETE FORMULAS BECAUSE I AGREE THAT THAT IS A DUTY OF THE ETHIOPIANS. BUT IF WE PROPOSE CONCRETE FORMULAE, IF I PUBLICLY COME OUT SPEAKING ABOUT A (BLANK IN TRANSCRIPT) THE ETHIOPIANS WHAT THEY HAVE TO DO. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE MADE A GENERAL STATEMENT, AS WE DID ON APRIL 22ND, ON THE OCCASION OF NOHETO'S (?) VISIT TO CUBA, WHEN HE TOOK NOTICE WHICH ARE OUR POINTS OF VIEW AND HE

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REJECTS THAT.

-- NOW, I ALSO BELIEVE THAT THE ETHIOPIANS HAVE THE RIGHT TO STRUGGLE AGAINST SECESSION. THEY HAVE THE FULL RIGHT AND THAT NO ONE CAN DENY THEM. THE UNITED STATES, ITSELF, IN THE LAST CENTURY FACED ITS POSSESSION PROBLEMS.

-- (BLANK IN TRANSCRIPT) A TRULY PEACEFUL MAN, AN EXTRA-ORDINARILY HUMAN, RESORTED TO WAR BEFORE ALLOWING POSSESSION IN THE UNITED STATES.

62. W: PRESIDENT CASTRO, YOU ARE REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD TWO U.S. CONGRESSMEN THAT YOU WOULD FACILITATE THE RETURN OF 1600 CUBAN-AMERICANS TO THE UNITED STATES. WILL YOU DO THAT AND IF SO, HOW?

63. C: ACTUALLY, WE HAVE BEEN ALLOWING THE NORTH AMERICANS TO -- THESE NORTH AMERICANS TO LEAVE, THEY ARE NOT NORTH AMERICANS. WELL, THEY SPEAK ABOUT PEOPLE TOO MUCH NOW BECAUSE I THINK THEY EVEN SPEAK OF SOMEONE WHO HAD AN AMERICAN GRANDFATHER.

-- OUR POSITION HAS BEEN FAVORABLE TO FACILITATE THE DEPARTURE OF ALL THESE PEOPLE WHO HAVE SOMETHING TO DO WITH U.S. NATIONALITY. IN THE CASE OF THE TWO CONGRESSMEN I EXPLAINED TO THEM THAT IN SPITE OF THIS PROBLEM OF THE INCIDENT OF THESE CHARGES, WE WERE IN A POSITION, WE WERE WILLING TO FACILITATE AND NOT PLACE ANY OBSTACLE TO THAT; THAT THEY SHOULD TELL US WHO THEY ARE, TO SEND A LIST AND WE, WITH GREAT PLEASURE, WOULD FACILITATE GIVING THEM ALL THE FACILITIES ----- THE UNITED STATES IF THEY SO WISHED. WE ARE NOT GOING TO FORCE ANYONE TO GO AND LIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. BUT TO TELL US WHOEVER HAS THIS

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DUAL NATIONALITY, WE WOULD WITH GREAT PLEASURE, IF THEY WANT TO LEAVE, WE WOULD FACILITATE THAT, AND I CAN RATIFY THAT HERE.

64. W: AND FINALLY, ON THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, FROM OUR EARLIER CONVERSATION, IF THE UNITED STATES WILL RELEASE THE PUERTO RICAN PRISONER, LOLITA BRAUN YOU WOULD RELEASE THE AMERICAN PRISONER LAWRENCE LUNT?

65. C: WE ARE WILLING TO DO SO. WE HAVE BEEN ASKED OPINIONS ABOUT THIS IN AN INDIRECT WAY AND WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR CONFORMITY. THAT DEPENDS ON THE PUERTO RICANS THEMSELVES. IF THEY ARE WILLING TO DO SO. NOW THEN, MENTION WAS MADE OF LOLITA BRAUN. I THINK LOLITA BRAUN DOES NOT EXPECT TO BE RELEASED ALONE. SHE ACCEPTED IF THE FOUR -- I THINK IT IS FOUR -- IF THEY FREE THEM ALL. I THINK IT IS FOUR. YOU ASK ME IF WE IN THAT CASE WOULD BE WILLING TO RELEASE THREE OTHER NORTH AMERICANS THAT I THINK ARE LEFT AND I SAID THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE THAT OR DISCUSS THAT WITH THE COMRADES OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY, BUT I WOULD FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THE PRISONERS OF THESE FOUR AMERICANS THAT ARE STILL IN PRISON, IF THE PUERTO RICANS ARE RELEASED.

66. W: AND IS THAT ALL THE AMERICAN PRISONERS WHO ARE IN YOUR PRISONS, JUST FOUR?

67. C: WELL, I DON'T KNOW. LATELY, BECAUSE OF COMMON TRYING BUT IN MY OPINION I THINK THERE ARE FOUR LEFT. I CANNOT SPEAK TO THAT ACTUALLY BUT THESE THREE OR FOUR LEFT WILL BE WILLING TO LEAVE. THAT IS MY POSITION AND I WOULD DEFEND THAT POSITION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.

68. W: THERE HAVE BEEN SOME PEOPLE WHO HAVE SAID THAT THERE SHOULD BE GREATER ECONOMIC PRESSURE PUT ON CUBA, UNCLASSIFIED

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THAT AMERICANS SHOULD TALK TO THEIR ALLIES TO PUT MORE PRESSURE. CANADA HAS ALREADY SAID THAT SHE WILL STOP AID. WHAT WOULD THIS LARGE ECONOMIC BLOCK DO TO YOU?

69. C: WELL, CANADA GIVES US A MODEST ASSISTANCE. IT IS NOT ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT. THEY ALWAYS KEPT TRADE WITH US THROUGHOUT THESE YEARS. IT RESISTED U.S. PRESSURE.

NOW THEN, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY WILL BE DRAGGED
TO THAT POLICY. I DON'T THINK SO.

70. W: THEY HAVE ALREADY SAID SO.

71. C: WELL, IT MAY BE THAT THEY INCORPORATE NOT TO THE
BLOCKAGE BUT MAYBE RATHER TO REDUCE OR MAYBE NOT FOR LONG,
FOR THE FUTURE, THE MODEST ASSISTANCE THAT THEY ARE OFFER-
ING US. IT IS MODEST. BUT IN SPITE OF THAT, WE ARE VERY
THANKFUL FOR IT, BUT IT IS NOT A DECISIVE AND FUNDAMENTAL

-- DO YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPENS? WELL, I BELIEVE THAT THE
UNITED STATES COULD NOT DRAG ALL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
TO GO INTO A GENERAL BLOCKADE AGAINST US.

-- IF THAT HAPPENS, WE CAN RESIST, BUT YOU SHOULD HAVE
NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT WE RESIST
WE WOULD BECOME MORE MILITANTLY ANTI-WESTERN.

72. W: THANK YOU VERY KINDLY, MR. PRESIDENT. VANCE

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